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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
This appeal arises from appellant C. Leon Smith's 
attempt to secure employment with appellee, The Equitable. 
He alleges that The Equitable refused to hire him because 
of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. S 1981; and the 
Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, 43 P.S. 955, et seq. The 
District Court found that the parties had entered into an 
arbitration agreement that covered Smith's claims. It 
granted The Equitable's motion to compel arbitration, and 
dismissed Smith's claims without prejudice. The District 
Court reasoned that arbitration was the only relief Smith 
was allowed under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 
U.S.C. SS 3-4. Smith now appeals, arguing that the District 
Court should not have applied or enforced the arbitration 
agreement. Because we lack appellate jurisdiction to hear 
an appeal of this type of interlocutory order, we will 
dismiss. 
 
II. 
 
In late 1996, Smith applied for a position selling"Series 
6" annuities for The Equitable, a registered broker-dealer of 
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securities. Joseph McDonough, a District Manager for The 
Equitable, interviewed Smith and forwarded his resume to 
an Agency Manager named Joel Albert. Allegedly, 
McDonough wanted to hire Smith but Albert stated he did 
not want Smith to work for The Equitable because he is 
African-American. However, in mid-January of 1997 
McDonough offered Smith a pre-employment contract to 
sell securities as a "prospective agent" of The Equitable. 
 
As a prospective agent, Smith could attempt to qualify for 
regular employment with The Equitable by selling securities 
for the company during a trial period. The Equitable 
considered prospective agents to be independent 
contractors, and allowed them to solicit offers for the sale 
of securities products on its behalf in order to evaluate 
them. To become a prospective agent, however, Smith was 
first required to register with the National Association of 
Securities Dealers ("NASD"). The NASD in turn required 
him to sign and submit an application called a U-4 
"Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or 
Transfer." This application stated that Smith agreed "to 
arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise 
between [him] and [his] firm, or a customer, or any other 
person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, 
constitutions, or by-laws" listed on the form. 
 
The NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, incorporated 
into the U-4 agreement, made the following matters eligible 
for arbitration: 
 
       [A]ny dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in 
       connection with the business of any members of the 
       [NASD], or arising out of or in connection with the 
       employment or termination of employment of 
       associated person(s) with any member . . .: 
 
       (a) between or among members; 
 
       (b) between or among members and associated 
       persons; 
 
       (c) between or among members or associated persons 
       and public customers, or others. 
 
NASD Manual -- Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10101 
(1997). 
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Of the disputes that are eligible for arbitration, the NASD 
Code requires that several types always be submitted to 
arbitration. These categories include disputes involving "a 
person associated with a member against a member" and 
vice-versa. NASD Code, Rule 10201(a). A person associated 
with a member is defined as "a natural person registered 
under the Rules of the [NASD] . . . or a natural person 
engaged in the investment banking or securities business 
who is directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by a 
member." NASD By-Laws, Art. 1 (ee). 
 
At the outset, the District Court correctly noted that the 
strong federal policy favoring arbitration required it to 
resolve all ambiguities in the U-4 agreement in favor of 
arbitration. See Smith v. The Equitable, 27 F. Supp. 2d 565, 
568 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 
146 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 
1028, 143 L. Ed. 2d 38, and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652, 114 L. 
Ed. 2d 26 (1991)). The District Court held that the scope of 
the U-4 agreement did cover Smith's claims, because they 
arose out of his pre-employment contract with The 
Equitable: 
 
       Accordingly, we find that Plaintiff 's current claims 
       either arise out of or in connection with the business 
       of a NASD member or arise out of the employment or 
       termination of employment of an associated person 
       with any member. Therefore, Plaintiff 's claims 
       constitute the type of claims anticipated by the 
       language of the U-4 Application and the NASD Code of 
       Arbitration Procedure. 
 
Smith v. The Equitable, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 568. 
 
Smith argued that the U-4 agreement should not apply in 
his case. He claimed that The Equitable fraudulently 
induced him to sign the agreement, when it knew that it 
would not hire him. Smith claims The Equitable thus 
tricked him into waiving his rights under Title VII, and the 
arbitration agreement should not be enforced as a result. 
The District Court agreed that the arbitration agreement 
would not be binding if Smith could demonstrate that it 
was based on fraud, duress, mistake, "or some other 
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ground recognized by the law applicable to contracts 
generally." Id. (citing Seus, 146 F.3d at 184 (quotation 
marks omitted)). However, the District Court also correctly 
noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require 
allegations of fraud to be pleaded with particularity. See 
Smith v. The Equitable, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 569; Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 9(b). It concluded that Smith had failed to do so. 
 
The District Court granted The Equitable's motion to 
compel arbitration. It also granted The Equitable's 
alternative motion to dismiss the litigation. The District 
Court reasoned that because all of Smith's claims were 
subject to arbitration, "retaining jurisdiction would serve no 
purpose." Smith v. The Equitable, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 569. It 
therefore dismissed Smith's claims without prejudice. 
Smith appeals on the grounds that the District Court 
misconstrued the applicability of the arbitration agreement, 
that he should have been allowed to plead his allegations of 
fraud with greater particularity, and that he did not make 
a knowing and voluntary waiver of his civil rights when he 
signed the arbitration agreement. 
 
III. 
 
Before we can consider Smith's arguments on the merits, 
we must address The Equitable's assertion that we lack 
appellate jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See Zosky v. 
Boyer, 856 F.2d 554, 555 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 1042, 109 S. Ct. 868, 102 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1989) 
(examining appellate jurisdiction to review order compelling 
arbitration sua sponte). Our jurisdiction depends on 
whether or not the District Court's order compelling 
arbitration was a final (and thus appealable) order, or 
whether it was an interlocutory (and thus non-appealable) 
order. 
 
Generally, a federal Court of Appeals may not hear an 
appeal from a non-final decision of a District Court. See 28 
U.S.C. S 1291.1 Subject to a limited exception,2 Section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Very limited exceptions to the rule that interlocutory orders are not 
immediately appealable may be found in 28 U.S.C.S 1292(a)(1) (for 
interlocutory orders involving injunctions) and 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) (for 
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16(b) of the F.A.A., 9 U.S.C. S 16(b), specifically prevents 
appeal of a District Court's interlocutory order compelling 
arbitration. This section provides that: 
 
       [A]n appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory 
       order granting a stay of any action under section 3 of 
       this title; directing arbitration to proceed under section 
       4 of this title; compelling arbitration under section 2063 
       of this title; or refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is 
       subject to this title. 
 
9 U.S.C. S 16(b)(1)-(4) (format altered). Section 16(b) of the 
F.A.A. reflects "the strong federal policy favoring 
arbitration." Seus, 146 F.3d at 179. Because the District 
Court did compel arbitration under Section 4 of the F.A.A., 
Section 16(b) prohibits us from hearing Smith's appeal if 
that order was interlocutory. Whether the order was 
interlocutory or not depends on whether it arose from an 
independent or an embedded proceeding. 
 
Independent proceedings are those which have been 
brought initially for the sole purpose of compelling 
arbitration pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. S 4. 
These proceedings arise independently of any other lawsuit, 
and the District Court's resulting order is immediately 
appealable as the final relief sought. As the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
certain certified questions). These grounds are generally not applicable 
in 
 
the arbitration context, because "no irreparable harm will be done to 
either party by requiring arbitration without an interlocutory appeal." 
Zosky, 856 F.2d at 561. 
 
2. Section 16(b) does not trump 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b), which allows the 
District Court to certify "controlling question of law as to which there 
is 
 
substantial ground for difference of opinion" such that immediate appeal 
"may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." This 
exception does not apply here. 
 
3. Section 206 provides that "[a] court having jurisdiction under this 
chapter may direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the 
agreement at any place therein provided for, whether that place is within 
or without the United States. Such court may also appoint arbitrators in 
accordance with the provisions of the agreement." 9 U.S.C. S 206. 
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       [i]f the suit is "independent," i.e., the plaintiff seeks an 
       order compelling or prohibiting arbitration or a 
       declaration that a dispute is arbitrable or not 
 
       arbitrable, and no party seeks any other relief, afinal 
       judgment ending such litigation is appealable at once 
       . . . . If arbitration has been ordered, the objecting 
       party need not await the outcome of the arbitration 
       before challenging the order to arbitrate. 
 
Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984 F.2d 58, 60 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted and format altered); see also 
Zosky, 856 F.2d at 557-59 (citing Rogers v. Schering Corp., 
262 F.2d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1959) (in banc) (recognizing 
distinction between independent proceedings to compel 
arbitration and those arising as a defense to other claims)). 
 
Embedded proceedings, on the other hand, are those in 
which an agreement to arbitrate forms a defense to a claim 
or claims brought before the court. Orders compelling 
arbitration in an embedded proceeding are interlocutory, 
and thus cannot be appealed according to Section 16(b) of 
the F.A.A. and the final decision rule contained in 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. As we have observed, "[i]t may appear 
anomalous for the appealability of what amounts to the 
same order to depend on the procedural posture of the case 
in the district court." Zosky, 856 F.2d at 560. However, 
 
       the underlying rationale . . . is that an order directing 
       arbitration is interlocutory and, therefore, not 
       appealable if it is made in a lawsuit, such as a suit for 
       damages, in which in the normal course of judicial 
       procedure there will be a later final order or judgment 
       from which an appeal can be taken by a person 
       aggrieved by the prior order to arbitrate. 
 
Id., 856 F.2d at 558 (quoting Rogers, 262 F.2d at 182). 
 
The question is which type of proceeding we have in this 
case. Smith filed a lawsuit against The Equitable seeking 
relief under various statutes. The Equitable responded by 
seeking to compel arbitration as a defense to the lawsuit. It 
is clear, therefore, that the motion to compel arbitration 
began as an embedded proceeding because "[a]rbitration is 
not the full relief sought by the plaintiff; indeed, the 
plaintiff opposes arbitration." Zosky, 856 F.2d at 559. The 
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wrinkle here is that the District Court both compelled 
arbitration and dismissed Smith's complaints. 
 
Generally, when a District Court grants an order 
compelling arbitration in an embedded proceeding, it will 
also stay the proceedings pursuant to Section 3 of the 
F.A.A., 9 U.S.C. S 3. Indeed, The Equitable argues that the 
District Court only has power to stay the claims, according 
to the mandatory language of Section 3. Although this may 
be the better practice, it was not error to dismiss. We have 
held in the context of an embedded proceeding that for 
reasons of judicial efficiency, when "all the claims involved 
in an action are arbitrable, a court may dismiss the action 
instead of staying it." Seus, 146 F.3d at 179 (citing Dancu 
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D. Pa. 
1991), aff 'd, 972 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 
An argument can thus be made that we should treat the 
present case more like an independent proceeding to 
compel arbitration than as an embedded one, because in 
the present case the District Court did not stay Smith's 
claims. The end result, one could argue, is thus more like 
that of an independent proceeding. We do not find this 
distinction very compelling. Smith's claims were dismissed 
without prejudice so that the arbitration could proceed in 
an efficient manner. He argues the arbitration agreement 
was invalid because he was never employed by The 
Equitable, that The Equitable never intended to employ 
him, and that his signature to the agreement was obtained 
by artifice. However, he can test the validity of the 
arbitration agreement before the arbitrator and still retain 
his rights, if he deems it necessary, to challenge the 
arbitration decision by re-filing his statement in the District 
Court. Because Smith may re-file in this event,"[t]he 
district court's order dismissing the action to the extent 
that it concluded the . . . matter was arbitrable is 
functionally analogous to the grant of a stay in an ongoing 
proceeding pending the outcome of arbitration." 
Communication Workers v. American Tel. & Tel., 932 F.2d 
199, 207 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
We thus hold that because the dismissal was the 
functional equivalent of a stay in this context, this is still 
an embedded proceeding. The important point is that the 
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District Court did compel arbitration. Where, as here, 
arbitration is a defense to litigation, arbitration provides 
"an expeditious and inexpensive mode of alternative dispute 
resolution." Communication Workers, 932 F.2d at 207. It 
would be contrary to Section 16(b) of the F.A.A. to allow an 
appeal of this order. Section 16(b) makes "clear that with 
respect to an interlocutory order issued in an ongoing 
proceeding, any order favoring litigation over arbitration is 
immediately appealable and any order favoring arbitration 
over litigation is not." Id. We are satisfied that we lack 
appellate jurisdiction to hear this matter. 
 
In an effort to circumvent this logic, Smith points out the 
similarities between the complaint in Seus and his own. In 
Seus, a former employee of a brokerage firm alleged that 
the firm violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e et seq., and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 
SS 621 et seq. The defendant raised as a defense the Form 
U-4 arbitration agreement that plaintiff had signed. The 
District Court compelled arbitration and dismissed the 
complaint, and this Court affirmed. Smith argues that 
because we reached the merits of an appeal of an order 
compelling arbitration in an embedded proceeding in Seus, 
this at least implicitly demonstrates that we have 
jurisdiction to reach the merits of his appeal as well. We 
disagree. In Zosky, we held that an order compelling 
arbitration arising from an embedded proceeding is not 
immediately appealable. See Zosky, 856 F.2d at 554. In 
Seus, we did not address jurisdiction.4 
 
We will dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because a later panel cannot overrule the holding of an earlier panel, 
Seus could not alter our holding in Zosky, implicitly or otherwise, unless 
it found the cases distinguishable. See Internal Operating Procedures 
S 9.1 (3d Cir. 1994) ("no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a 
published opinion of a previous panel. Court in banc consideration is 
required to do so."). 
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